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Over the next four decades, increasing old-age dependency ratios exert an enormous upward 
pressure on welfare spending in most developed countries. As this is mainly due to existing 
unfunded public pension schemes, many countries have embarked on far-reaching reforms in 
this area, strengthening actuarial fairness, modifying indexation rules, adding elements of 
prefunding and, last but not least, attempting to extend the period of economic activity. 
Efforts to contain costs may also be relevant with regard to public expenditure on health and 
long-term care but, thus far, no country has started to really deal with these issues. Still, some 
countries have made substantial progress in securing the long-term sustainability of their 
welfare systems. What remains to be considered is re-constructing the system of 
intergenerational transactions as a potential way of removing disincentives to raise children 
and invest in their human capital in the long run. 
JEL-Code: H50, H68, J11. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
While the economic consequences of ageing are open to debate in many other areas, its 
impact on the welfare state is unambiguous – and all in all rather unfavourable. Patterns 
of demographic ageing differ substantially across countries. However, in all developed 
countries it is expected to lead to major shifts in the age composition of total population 
over the next three to four decades, with a decreasing share of individuals in their active 
life span and an increasing share of those of retirement age. Given that, the impact of 
ageing on the welfare state is basically a function of how deeply the state is involved in 
the areas of old-age provision, provision and/or financing of health services and long-
term care, as well as in the fields of child-care, education and financial support for fami-
lies. Of course, it is also a matter of how the relevant schemes are designed. 
 
Clearly, countries with more generous public pension schemes and heavier public inter-
vention with regard to health and long-term care are facing greater difficulties in keep-
ing these systems sustainable as the process of ageing unfolds. There are considerable 
cross-country differences regarding the scope and the generosity of the welfare state’s 
activities. But virtually nowhere does the state refrain entirely from engaging in any of 
the areas mentioned here. Furthermore, a common feature of virtually all programmes 
applied is that they are – or, at least, have been – mainly based on the pay-as-you-go 
mechanism. Schemes of this type redistribute from working-age individuals to the old 
and are thus hit rather immediately by the prospective shifts in demographic fundamen-
tals. 
 
Countries with relatively high levels of public spending on the young may hope for 
some relief from the demographic strain on their welfare systems through a decreasing 
share of beneficiaries at this end. Yet, now that the last rounds of a major decline in 
birth rates are typically twenty to thirty years past, this ‘demographic dividend’ is likely 
to be small or even zero in the future. There is no obvious prediction for the trends in 
welfare expenditure on the working-age population, such as unemployment benefits or 
social assistance, during the up-coming period of overt demographic ageing. As a con-
sequence, pressures on the welfare state arising from programmes mainly geared to-
wards the elderly will most likely be the dominant effects. 
 
In many countries, the welfare state could definitely not be considered sustainable vis-à-
vis the prospects of ageing if the legal framework for its main branches had been kept 
unchanged since the 1980s and 1990s. This prediction has not only been subject to ex-
tensive study by researchers in recent years. To a considerable extent, it has even re-  2
ceived attention by politicians and the greater public, soliciting debates about reforms 
virtually everywhere and triggering steps to actually reforming existing welfare pro-
grammes in quite a number of cases. This is particularly true with respect to public pen-
sion schemes. With regard to financing long-term care, the consequences of ageing are 
similarly clear-cut, but public involvement in this field is less universal and often spread 
across different programmes. With regard to health expenditure, disputes remain about 
the precise nature of effects related to ageing as well as about the significance of further 
determinants of long-term cost dynamics. In this field, there have thus been numerous 
attempts at short-term cost containment. But far-sighted, fundamental reforms are basi-
cally absent. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we highlight demo-
graphic trends and their impact on public expenditure in all major branches of the wel-
fare state under constant policies. In Section III, we review recent trends in policy re-
forms aiming to mitigate the consequences of ageing in several OECD countries. Fi-
nally, in Section IV we discusses whether the reforms already implemented appear to be 
sufficient for making the welfare state sustainable and point to further aspects that may 
be relevant in this regard. 
 
 
II. DEPENDENCY RATIOS AND WELFARE EXPENDITURE 
 
II.1 Demographic Dependency: Projected Changes 
 
Probably the most important indicator of demographic ageing and its consequences for 
the welfare state is given by the old-age dependency ratio (OADR). It is conventionally 
defined as the number of individuals aged 65 and over per individuals aged 15 to 64 in 
the population of a given country. This ratio feeds through, though not necessarily on a 
one-for-one basis, to the systems’ dependency ratios of many welfare programmes, e.g., 
the ratio of pensioners over contributors in the working-age population, or the ratio of 
older individuals with higher average health costs over prime-aged individuals making 
net contributions to actually funding these costs. The OADR of course neglects the fact 
that many individuals aged 15–64 are still enrolled in secondary or tertiary education, 
do not participate in the labour force for various reasons, are unemployed or have al-
ready entered early retirement. But it describes the demographic fundamentals for fi-
nancing benefits that mainly accrue to the elderly. An important qualification is that, 
while influencing the time path of the OADR is difficult even over a longer time hori-  3
zon, behavioural and institutional features affecting the labour market status of indi-
viduals of a given age may be subject to political action. 
 



















































































Source: UN Population Division (2009), constant-fertility variant. 
 
Figure 1 shows expected changes in the OADR for a number of OECD countries over 
the next decades. In the US, with a relatively high fertility rate, the ratio was at a low   4
level of 19% in the year of 2000. It is expected to increase to 29% until 2025 and to 
34% until 2050. In Japan, the OADR was at 25% in 2000, and it is projected to increase 
to 50% until 2025 and to 76% until 2050 (UN Population Division, 2009).
1 Most other 
developed countries lie in between these two scenarios, implying that the number of 
older people per individuals of working age will increase by between 50% and 200% 
and will typically more than double over the time period considered here. If labour force 
participation remains as it is and if contribution rates are kept constant, this means that 
the quasi-replacement rates of pension benefits, measuring the ratio of average pensions 
over average wages, will drop by 33% to 66%. If replacement rates were kept constant – 
a wide-spread feature of pension policies in many countries until the 1990s – contribu-
tion rates would have to increase by the same rate as the OADR. 
 
Purely demographic effects for health costs are likely to be less dramatic. Age-specific 
per-capita expenditure on health is typically increasing around the retirement age, but an 
important fraction of total health costs is still falling on younger individuals. In some 
countries, the state actually concentrates on covering health costs of the elderly, imply-
ing that expenditure in these programmes could nevertheless grow in line with the 
OADR. At the same time, it is possible that age-specific health risks, hence age-related 
health costs at higher ages, may decline with longer life expectancy, thus taking away 
some of the demographic upward pressure. 
 
For long-term care, dependency ratios that would be similarly informative should 
probably consider individuals aged 85 and over compared to the number of individuals 
aged 15 to 64. These dependency ratios grow even much faster than the standard OADR 
because they are much more affected by increases in life expectancy. Unlike public pen-
sions, however, long-term care has to be financed only for some of the elderly, so that 
the upward pressure on public expenditure in this area is less worrying on absolute 
terms. Also, age-specific prevalence rates may decline over time as the population lives 
longer. Furthermore, the state typically covers only a fraction of total costs of long-term 
care, e.g., through social insurance schemes with caps on current costs covered or 
through programmes specifically addressing the needy. 
 
                                            
1   Here, we rely on the ‘constant-fertility’ variant of the latest release of the United Nations’ World 
Population Prospects. In their ‘medium’ variant, the UN Population Division assumes that, throughout 
the world, fertility rates converge towards 1.85 in a long-term process. In the absence of any changes 
in behaviour and relevant institutions, this assumption appears to be less plausible for quite a number 
of developed countries.   5



















































































Source: UN Population Division (2009), constant-fertility variant. 
 
Another indicator that is potentially important with respect to the consequences of age-
ing is the total dependency ratio (TDR), relating the number of children below age 15 
plus the number of elderly people aged 65 and over to the number of individuals aged 
15 to 64. To the extent that ageing is driven by a decline in fertility, the youth-  6
dependency component of this measure decreases over time. This may compensate to 
some extent for the heavier burden involved in higher old-age dependency. 
 
Indeed, the rise in total dependency is typically less pronounced than the increase in the 
OADR (see Figure 2). In the US, total dependency is projected to increase from 51% in 
2000 to 65% in 2050; in the UK the respective figures are 53% and 65%. Countries that 
are facing a sharp increase in old-age dependency and, at the same time, have a low 
fertility rate already today should expect far stronger increases in the TDR. For exam-
ple, in Germany the ratio increases from 47% in 2000 to 80% in 2050, and in Japan it 
rises from 47% to 94% (UN Population Division, 2009). Clearly, in countries where 
fertility has already been low for several decades, the number of youths relative to that 
of working-age individuals will not decrease much further in the future. The relief for 
workers who have to take care for fewer children through child-related benefits and 
education financed from the government budget will thus be small or even insignificant. 
 
In public discussions it is sometimes asserted that benefits related to unemployment 
among the working-age generation should become less pressing in the ageing process as 
it is often associated with a shrinking workforce. By this naïve view, unemployment 
rates should decline as soon as the number of retiring workers exceeds the number of 
individuals entering the labour market. This conclusion ignores that there are institu-
tional determinants of unemployment. For instance, wage setting may counteract the 
demographic processes if bargaining parties take into account both the shrinking labour 
supply and the expected increase in wage taxes which are needed to finance for increas-
ing old-age dependency. In fact, the financial burden for those in employment may well 
rise through higher benefits paid to members of their own generation, given that higher 
wage taxes could trigger higher unemployment through more aggressive wage setting. 
 
 
II.2 The Impact on Welfare Expenditure If Policies Remain Unchanged 
 
All in all, changes in the age structure of the population expected for the next three to 
four decades exert an enormous upward pressure on welfare expenditure in most indus-
trialized countries. To illustrate this, let us consider some simple estimates regarding a 
‘constant-policy’ scenario for changes in age-related public expenditure in the OECD 
countries looked at so far. Here, ‘constant policy’ is taken to indicate that eligibility 
rules, benefit levels and, most generally speaking, the extent of public involvement in 
any of the relevant branches of welfare expenditure remain as they were before ageing 
became really acute. Consequently, we also abstract from any behavioural changes on   7
the side of future beneficiaries. Note that actual policies which have been legislated to 
deal with the consequences of ageing are often phased in over a longer period of time. 
They are thus rarely constant in this sense. Our calculations are based on year-2000 fig-
ures for welfare expenditure per GDP taken from the OECD SOCX (2008) database. 
Until 2000, far-reaching policy responses to the prospects of ageing were less common 
than they have been since then. More importantly, where major reforms had been taken 
well before this year – most notably in the US in 1983 or in Italy in 1992/95 – their im-
pact on current expenditure in 2000 was still limited through long transition periods.
2 
 
Table 1 shows how the major age-related branches of public welfare expenditure would 
evolve between 2000 and 2050 if, under the demographic scenarios illustrated in Fig-
ures 1 and 2, the legal framework remained entirely unchanged. More specifically, our 
hypothetical calculations are based on the following assumptions. 
 
−  Public old-age pensions and survivor benefits per capita of the population aged 
65 and over remain constant as a share in GDP per worker, with the employ-
ment-to-population ratio among those aged 15 to 64 being constant as well. 
Therefore, expenditure on these items changes in line with the expected increase 
in the OADR. 
−  Public expenditure on health care which can be attributed to individuals aged 65 
and over based on national institutions and a typical age profile of total health 
costs (European Commission and Economic Policy Committee, 2009, Sect. 3.2) 
changes in line with (i) the expected increase in the OADR, (ii) an extension of 
years in good health corresponding to expected increases in life expectancy. 
−  Public expenditure on long-term care is projected in basically the same way as 
health expenditure, concentrating (i) on changes in old-age dependency for those 
aged 85 and over and (ii) on shifts in age specific prevalence rates and costs 
(European Commission and Economic Policy Committee, 2009, Sect.  10.2) 
which again parallel expected increases in life expectancy. 
−  Public spending on child benefits, pre-primary child care and compulsory 
schooling (i.e., primary to upper secondary education) per capita of the popula-
tion in the relevant age groups remains constant as a share in GDP per worker. 
Thus, it basically changes in line with expected shifts in youth dependency. 
                                            
2   In the US, this applies to the increase in the age threshold for claiming full benefits: in 1983, it was 
scheduled to increase from age 65 to 67 starting from the year 2002. Another major element of the 
early reforms taken in the US, viz. the expansion of the Social Security Trust Funds, was not about 
curtailing future expenditure, but about how they shall be financed.   8
−  Public spending on unemployment benefits and other transfers to individuals of 
working age are not mainly driven by ageing. For simplicity, it is therefore as-
sumed to remain constant in terms of GDP per worker and, hence, ignored here. 
 
By these assumptions as well as in terms of the projection methods applied, our exercise 
is much in the spirit of early attempts at assessing the impact of ageing on public pen-
sion schemes (see, e.g., Hagemann and Nicoletti, 1989; Roseveare et al., 1996). Our 
calculations are broader in scope, covering all categories of welfare-state expenditure 
that are clearly age-related. Furthermore, they are not meant to give a picture of actual 
developments, but to demonstrate the upward pressure exerted on public expenditure 
purely through demographic trends.
3 
 
Table 1 reveals that the potential impact of ageing on welfare expenditure is very strong 
in many developed countries. From 2000 to 2050, the hypothetical increase in expendi-
ture on old-age pensions, survivor benefits, health care and long-term care, corrected for 
potential reductions in expenditure on child benefits and public schooling, amounts to 
only 2.1% of GDP in the UK. At the same time, it is 7.6% in the US, no less than 11.5% 
in France and over 20% in Japan and Germany. By far the most important driver of 
these changes is pension expenditure under the assumption of constant eligibility rules, 
benefit levels and retirement behaviour. The impact of public health expenditure varies 
substantially. In spite of assumptions that are plausible, but relatively mild, its resulting 
increase is considerable in the US and definitely strong in Germany and Japan. Reduc-
tions in expenditure on children are small everywhere, exceeding 1% of GDP only in 
Austria and in several transition countries which are otherwise rather strongly affected 
by the impact of ageing on their welfare expenditure. 
 
Whatever the precise definition of ‘sustainability’, it appears that the welfare state could 
not be considered sustainable in the majority of countries considered here in a ‘constant-
policy’ scenario based on year-2000 figures for benefit expenditure and current pros-
pects for demographic ageing until 2050. Thus far, however, we have deliberately ig-
nored the many steps to reform, some incremental in their nature and some very far-
reaching, which have been taken in many developed countries in order to deal with this 
unfavourable outlook. 
                                            
3   Our calculations may overstate this pressure as they ignore numerous details in eligibility rules in-
volved in national law, inferring their impact from demographic proportions. Otherwise, some care has 
been expended on preparing plausible ‘constant-policy’ scenarios for the consequences of ageing on 
public welfare expenditure, taking into account detailed, high-quality data and some of the wisdom de-
riving from more realistic projection exercises, such as those conducted by the OECD (2001, ch. 4) or 
the European Commission and the Economic Policy Committee (2006; 2009).   9
Table 1: Age-related public expenditure in OECD countries, 
      hypothetical increase under ‘constant’ policies 
  Old-age & Survi-
vor Pensions 
Health care  
& LTC 
Child benefits  
& education 
Total 
  Level Change Level Change Level Change Level Change 
 2000  2000   
to 2050 
2000 2000   
to 2050 
2000 2000   
to 2050 
2000 2000   
to 2050 
  % of GDP 
UK  5.4 +3.0  6.2 –0.4  6.7 –0.6 18.3 +2.1 
Sweden  9.2 +4.7  7.0 –0.5  7.6 –0.2 23.7 +4.0 
Denmark  6.3 +4.9  6.8 +1.5  8.2 –0.3 21.2 +6.1 
Ireland
a  3.7 +5.2  5.6 +2.3  5.4 –0.4 14.7 +7.1 
USA  5.9 +4.8  5.9 +3.1  4.9 –0.2 16.7 +7.6 
Hungary  7.6 +8.5  5.2 +1.3  6.4 –1.4 19.2 +8.4 
Belgium  7.6 +6.4  8.0 +2.4  6.6 ±0.0 22.2 +8.7 
Netherlands 4.5 +5.6  6.2 +3.5  5.2 –0.4 15.9 +8.8 
Finland  7.7 +7.8  5.9 +2.2  6.8 –0.1 20.4 +9.9 
France  11.0 +9.8  8.3 +1.7  7.8 ±0.0 27.1  +11.5 
Czech  Rep.  7.7  +12.2 6.2  +3.3 5.1  –0.6  19.0  +14.9 
Portugal  8.2  +12.7 6.5  +3.1 5.2  –0.9  19.9  +14.9 
Spain  8.4  +13.4 5.6  +3.3 4.6  ±0.0 18.7  +16.6 
Slovakia  6.3  +13.5 5.1  +4.5 2.9  –1.1  14.4  +16.8 
Austria  11.7  +15.9 7.5  +4.2 7.1  –1.4  26.3  +18.7 
Italy  13.6  +18.4 5.9  +2.2 4.7  –0.1  24.2  +20.4 
Germany 10.3  +15.9 8.6  +5.6 5.5  –1.0  24.4  +20.5 
Japan  7.0  +14.0 7.1  +8.5 3.8  –0.6  17.9  +21.9 
Poland  10.3  +21.0 4.2  +3.7 5.1  –1.9  19.6  +22.8 
a) Figures for Ireland are expressed in % of Gross National Income. 




III. TRENDS IN POLICY REFORMS 
 
It is impossible to provide a full overview of policy measures aiming at improvements 
in the short-term and long-term fiscal stance of all branches of the welfare state which 
have been taken in OECD countries in recent years. As a stylised fact, many countries 
have embarked on serious approaches to reforming their pension systems, while little 
has been done about financing health care or long-term care that goes beyond some   10
short-term cost containment. In this section, we will therefore concentrate on highlight-
ing major trends in national pension policies, some of which could also be applied to 
other branches of the welfare state. Also, improvements in labour market performance 
can have a strong impact on the long-term perspectives for financing the welfare sys-
tem. We will thus include these issues as an aside. 
 
 
III.1 Strengthening Actuarial Fairness 
 
Where the earlier design of public pension schemes left room for that, authorities have 
often taken measures to strengthen actuarial fairness within these schemes. Even in 
many ‘Bismarckian’ pension schemes with a notable tax-benefit link, benefit assess-
ment was traditionally based on a limited number of ‘best years’ with highest contribu-
tions, or on end-of-career levels of covered earnings. Actuarial adjustments then imply 
that benefits are now more and more assessed based on life-long earnings. Examples of 
relevant reforms are given by Italy (in a first round of reforms enacted in 1992), France 
(in 1993 and, again, in 2003) or Austria (in 2003). In addition, many pension schemes 
used to provide non-contributory benefits tied to specific contingencies or periods typi-
cally not covered with contributions. Often, entitlements of this kind have been scaled 
back through series of incremental changes, e.g., in Germany (between 1992 and 2001). 
Exceptional and extreme steps to abolishing non-contributory benefits were made in 
Sweden, where survivor benefits were essentially wiped out (in 1990) and where the 
traditional pension system combining universal lump-sum benefits with earnings-related 
pensions for employees was transformed (in 2000) into a pension scheme which is now 
probably more Bismarckian than the German one. The main goal of such reforms is to 
reduce the tax-like character of contributions, thus promoting labour supply across the 
board. 
 
On the other hand, countries that mainly rely on ‘Beveridgean’ pension schemes with 
lump-sum benefits in their public pillar of old-age provision, have often tried to make 
sure that their systems really provide an adequate basic cover, effectively expanding the 
interpersonal redistribution of income involved in these schemes. Here, the most promi-
nent example is given by the UK (from 2002 onwards), with a revitalisation of the Basic 
State Pension and remarkable changes in the legal framework for supplementary, or 
second, public pensions, effectively making the latter less and less earnings-related. 
 
Another field where actuarial principles have often been strengthened are the options to 
retire early drawing on public pensions (or other benefits that define an exit route from   11
labour force participation to retirement). When unemployment was high in the 1980s 
and early 1990s, virtually all countries in continental Europe created incentives in fa-
vour of early retirement, implying that the average age of retirement often became 
rather low there (see Fenge and Pestieau, 2005). As this strategy which was also meant 
to promote employment among younger individuals did not work, it was later termi-
nated and even reversed. As a rule, individuals who want to retire before they reach a 
certain age threshold are now faced with reductions in pension benefits through shorter 
periods with contributions as well as special deductions to compensate for their longer 
duration of benefits. These benefit deductions are not always actuarially fair in a strict 
sense, implying that the pension scheme is still not entirely neutral with respect to the 
timing of retirement. But they clearly reduce third-party payments involved in the old 




III.2 Switching From DB to NDC 
 
Next to rules applying to the assessment of benefits at award, rules for indexing pension 
benefits over time are also important determinants of the long-term trends in pension 
expenditure. Traditionally, most public pension schemes employ indexation rules by 
which benefits are regularly up-rated in line with wages, prices, or some mixture be-
tween these two approaches. Within this range of options, it is thus possible to switch 
from a more generous to a less generous variant. For example, Germany switched from 
gross to net wage indexation (in 1992), and France switched from wage indexation to a 
US-style, mixed indexation regime (in 1993), that is, to an assessment of individual 
benefits based on wage indexation of previous earnings, followed by annual up-ratings 
based on price indexation. In contrast, the UK moved from price indexation of benefits 
and all relevant thresholds by which the Basic State Pension eroded substantially during 
the 1980s and 1990s to a mixed regime with wage up-ratings of benefits (in 2002). 
 
Basically, indexation rules are elements of pension schemes which fall into the DB (‘de-
fined benefits’) category: in these systems, benefits are determined and indexed so as to 
provide some defined amount or, rather, level of benefits. Contribution rates or taxes 
then have to be adjusted to meet the system’s current financial obligations. As a new 
strategy for coping with the ageing problem, a few countries changed this logic, estab-
lishing what is now called NDC (‘notionally defined contributions’) schemes. In these 
schemes, contribution rates are essentially fixed at a level which, for various reasons, 
should not be exceeded. The level of benefits then becomes endogenous, corresponding   12
to what can be financed for individual beneficiaries given this contribution rate and the 
current systems’ dependency ratio. Two countries that openly adopted NDC-type rules 
are Italy (in 1995) and Sweden (in 2000). Germany introduced a demographic factor 
into its indexation formula (in 2004) by which an increase in the dependency ratio feeds 
back on benefit up-ratings, implying that the German statutory pension scheme is now 
situated somewhere between a traditional DB and an NDC arrangement. 
 
The application of actuarial principles to public pay-as-you-go pension schemes and a 
switch from defined benefits to defined contributions are both inspired by features of 
private, funded pension schemes. Noting that large-scale demographic ageing may also 
cause problems for funded schemes, but has a negative first-order effect only on un-
funded pensions (Brooks 2000; Börsch-Supan et al., 2003; Fehr et al., 2005), there have 
been intensive discussions as to whether funding offers a meaningful option for dealing 
with the ageing problem. 
 
 
III.3 Is Funding a Way Out? 
 
When ageing first appeared to become an issue, a widely-held view among economists 
was that unfunded public pension schemes are effective in securing some amount of 
old-age provision for all those covered, albeit at a low rate of return. The internal rate of 
return to contributions made to these systems is the rate of payroll growth, which must 
be expected to fall short of the market rate of interest over longer periods of time. Many 
economists concluded that converting unfunded systems into funded ones, while paying 
off all existing unfunded liabilities, should lead to welfare gains (see, e.g., Feldstein, 
1995). However, Breyer (1989) and Fenge (1995) demonstrated that this view is flawed. 
The pay-as-you-go mechanism as such is ‘intergenerationally efficient’ in the sense that 
transforming unfunded pension schemes into funded schemes is impossible without 
harming at least some generation. The burden involved in ageing can thus be shared in 
various ways between future generations, the active generation and those in retirement, 
but it can never be removed (see also Fenge and Werding, 2004). 
 
Yet, even if pre-funding is not unambiguously superior, there are still good reasons to 
expand the share in old-age income which is derived from funded pension plans when 
the return to unfunded schemes becomes even lower – for the young in a DB-type 
scheme, for the old under NDC rules – because of the demographic pressure. Additional 
considerations regarding risk diversification aside, the simple logic of such policies is to 
use financial and real capital as a substitute for human capital, by which pay-as-you-go   13
schemes are effectively funded, now that the latter is increasingly lacking (for a pro-
nounced exposition, see Sinn 2000). Consequently, a number of countries have gone in 
this direction, either building up ‘demographic buffer funds’ inside their public pension 
schemes, as in the US (in 1983), Finland (in 1997), Ireland (in 1999), or Spain (in 
2001); establishing new mandatory plans supplementing public pensions, as in Denmark 
(in 1999) or Sweden (in 2000); or subsidising private, voluntary provisions, as in Ger-
many (in 2001) or France (in 2003). Where complementary funding is meant to partially 
replace mandatory public old-age provision, making sure that individuals really partici-
pate may become important, at least in the sense that gaps in coverage through existing 
occupational or private pension plans could be filled through an automatic enrolment, as 
in the UK (starting from 2012). Otherwise, all these arrangements have specific merits 
and risks, an important issue being how they perform with respect to the potential trade-
off between transaction costs involved and the scope for choice given to investors, 
which needs to be seen in most cases. 
 
 
III.4 Creating a Framework for Longer Working Lives 
 
Many countries, especially in Europe, are still struggling to increase the effective age of 
retirement beyond age 60 and to increase the statutory retirement age to 65, which ap-
pears to be the current international standard for men and women alike. Meanwhile, a 
few countries have already started to increase the age threshold for claiming full bene-
fits from 65 to 67. The first country taking this measure were the US, where a schedule 
was devised at a rather early stage (in 1983) by which the new age limit is phased in 
now from 2002 to 2027. More recently, Germany adopted a similar schedule (in 2007, 
phased in from 2012 to 2031). In Denmark, the statutory retirement age had been at 67 
until a few years ago, while the effective retirement age was substantially lower through 
generous early retirement rules. Now, the statutory limit will be increased from age 65 
to 67 again (enacted in 2009, taking effect from 2024 to 2027) and then linked to the 
conditional life expectancy at age 60. 
 
Expanding the period of economic activity as longevity increases directly addresses a 
major cause of the impact of ageing on public pension schemes. Furthermore, it is a 
powerful instrument to slow down expected increases in systems’ dependency ratios, 
affecting both the numerator and the denominator of this figure. As a consequence, it 
may allow for paying higher annual benefits to future pensioners than under any of the 
other approaches to reform discussed before – albeit for a shorter period of their lives 
(see Werding, 2007, for a demonstration of these effects taking the German reform as an   14
example). All this is true, of course, only if individuals are really able to stay active for 
a longer period of their lives. Note that, in this regard, sickness and incapacity need not 
be limitations of growing importance as it can be expected that a major share of addi-
tional years of life expectancy is spent in good health. 
 
In countries where structural unemployment is high, or where labour-force participation 
of particular groups – most notably among women and older workers – is relatively low, 
labour market reforms and other measures aiming to overcome these problems are use-
ful for various reasons. Successful policies in both these areas are also important pre-
requisites for dealing with the ageing problem, if only for their positive impact on em-
ployment and GDP. Aspects which are particularly important for serious attempts at 
expanding the active life span of individuals relate to the supply of, and the demand for, 
older workers. For this strategy to work, several kinds of adjustments are required. First, 
individuals need to adapt their life-cycle plans, a major condition being that the changes 
in relevant rules are announced in good time. Second, firms may have to re-consider 
their current habits regarding additional training for older workers, and they may also 
have to think about working conditions and new jobs which are suitable for people 
working until age 65 and beyond. Last but not least, further adjustments in labour mar-
ket institutions and welfare schemes are needed as they still tend to accommodate early 
exits from the labour market in many ways. Where steps in this direction have been 
made, e.g. through changes in job search requirements for unemployed individuals aged 
55 and over, closure of retirement pathways through systems providing unemployment 
benefits, sickness or incapacity benefits etc., the experience appears to encouraging 
(see, e.g., Whiteford, 2006; OECD, 2006). 
 
 
IV. IS SUSTAINABILITY SECURED? 
 
IV.1 How to Define Sustainability? 
 
Calculations like those presented in Section II easily support the conclusion that the 
sustainability of welfare programmes is threatened by the consequences of ageing if 
policies remain unchanged. When discussions about these issues started, ‘sustainability’ 
was mainly seen as a political category, essentially referring to increases in contribution 
rates and/or reductions in benefit levels that appeared to be politically feasible. In the 
meantime, the concept has been given some economic content, building on the observa-
tion that unfunded benefit entitlements offered by many welfare schemes constitute an 
implicit type of public debt and on the idea that the government has to meet an inter-  15
temporal budget constraint when paying off this implicit as well as all explicit debt (see 
Blanchard, 1990; Auerbach et al., 1991; or for a critical assessment, Haveman, 1994). 
Projected increases in expenditure ratios are effectively one way in which the implicit 
debt will become apparent over time if contributions or taxes are not increased corre-
spondingly. It is also possible to directly calculate the amount of implicit liabilities in-
volved in existing welfare programmes. However, the results are difficult to interpret, 
not only because they often appear to be enormously high when compared to official, 
explicit debt figures, or because they are extremely sensitive to assumptions regarding 
future interest rates, but above all because some amount of total public debt is sustain-
able, while it remains unclear, how much. 
 
In their attempts to monitor public finances under the EU Stability and Growth Pact, the 
Economic Policy Committee (2003; EPC) has therefore developed simple, illustrative 
‘sustainability-gap’ measures which are now regularly applied to assessing the long-
term sustainability of public finances in EU member states with an eye on the prospects 
of demographic ageing. The most comprehensive variant of these measures accounts for 
projected increases in benefit expenditure in all major branches of the welfare state over 
a virtually infinite time horizon. The sustainability gap then corresponds to a constant 
percentage of GDP by which annual ‘primary’ deficit ratios (leaving out interest pay-
ments on existing debt) in the general-government budget would have to be improved 
against a baseline, or current-policy, scenario in each year starting from now in order to 
smooth the fiscal burden of ageing over time and to observe the government’s intertem-
poral budget constraint. Improvements in deficit ratios can be brought about by corre-
sponding expenditure cuts or tax increases, probably with asymmetric effects through 
behavioural changes which are induced in either case, or through a broader class of 
policies suited to stimulate the growth of GDP as the reference figure for these ratios. 
 
 
IV.2 The Impact of Ageing on Welfare Expenditure Under Actual Policies 
 
To illustrate the current stance of public finances as a whole, and of welfare expenditure 
in particular, in terms of their long-term sustainability, let us first return to projected 
increases in public age-related expenditure (as in Table 1) now referring to recent, more 
subtle projections conducted by the European Commission and the Economic Policy 
Committee (2006), respectively by the OECD (2001, ch. 4) for non-EU member coun-  16
tries.
4 The results (see Table 2) are meant to show the consequences of current policies 
pursued in each country, including changes which have already been legislated, but will 
become effective only over time. The table also displays results for the EPC’s sustain-
ability gap which have been calculated building on these expenditure projections by the 
European Commission (2006) and by Hauner et al. (2007). 
 
In Table 2, countries are ranked according to the strength of the impact of ageing on 
total age-related expenditure. A ranking according to the size of the sustainability gap 
would be similar, but not identical since the latter is also affected by the initial amount 
of (explicit) public (net) debt, also reflecting the extent of pre-funding for future benefit 
expenditure, and by the initial budgetary position. The table shows that, under actual 
policies which have been devised for the future, expected increases in welfare expendi-
ture are substantially smaller in most cases than is suggested by purely demographic 
trends (cf. Table 1). In particular, where they have been made, pension reforms strongly 
contribute to improving the fiscal sustainability of the welfare state as this is where the 
reductions mainly come from. Another remarkable observation is that reforms appear to 
have been strongest where the pressure involved in ageing is most imminent. 
 
A downside involved in far-reaching pension reforms which often came in several 
rounds is that expected reductions in replacement rates are now so strong that future 
old-age poverty becomes an issue of major concern in a number of developed countries. 
To reflect this in their records of recent pension reforms, the OECD (2009, ch. I.3) has 
now introduced a new category of potential reform goals, viz. the ‘adequacy’ of provi-
sions. Ironically, many measures that are listed there would be mentioned again under 
other goals, such as ‘economic efficiency’ or ‘financial sustainability’, if they were soon 
rolled back or abandoned. This points to material conflicts which certainly cannot be 
solved when setting up a synopsis of pension policies pursued in different countries. 
Striking the right balance between these conflicting goals in ageing societies is clearly a 
challenge for policy making which needs to be addressed at the national level. We may 
add here that, if public pensions have to be cut back to become sustainable, making 
complementary savings mandatory and extending the period of employment are cer-
tainly among the few options that remain. 
 
                                            
4   The OECD involved national experts in their large-scale projection exercise and clearly directed them 
in their work to make the results comparable. Borrowing much of the methodology from the OECD, 
the Ageing Working Group of the EU Economic Policy Committee, supported by other Commission 
services, prepared up-dated projections for the EU-25 member states five years later. More recent up-
dates with projections for EU-27 member states until 2060 have just been released in European Com-
mission and Economic Policy Committee (2009).   17
Table 2: Age-related public expenditure in OECD countries, 
      projected increase under current policies 
 Public   
Pensions 
Health care  
& LTC 




  Level Change Level Change Level Change Level Change 






2004 2004   
to 2050 
  % of GDP 
Poland 13.9  –5.9  4.2 +1.5 5.0 –1.9 23.1 –6.3  –2.5
Austria 13.4  –1.2  5.9 +2.5 5.1 –1.0 24.4 +0.3  –1.5
Italy 14.2  +0.4  7.3 +2.0 4.3 –0.6 25.8 +1.8  –0.8
Sweden 10.6  +0.6  10.5 +2.7 7.3 –0.9 28.4 +2.4  +1.2
Germany 11.4  +1.7  7.0 +2.2 4.0 –0.9 22.4 +3.0  +1.3
Slovakia 7.2  +1.8  5.1 +2.5 3.7 –1.3 16.0 +3.0  +2.8
Japan
a 7.9  +0.6  5.8 +2.4 n.a. n.a. 13.7 +3.0  +6.2
France
b 12.8  +2.0  7.7 +1.8 5.0 –0.5 25.5 +3.3  +2.2
UK 6.6  +2.0  8.0 +2.7 4.6 –0.6 19.2 +4.1  +2.8
Denmark 9.5  +3.3  8.0 +2.1 7.8 –0.3 25.3 +5.1 –0.8
Netherlands 7.7  +3.5 6.6 +1.9 4.8 –0.2 19.1 +5.2  +4.2
USA
a 4.6  +2.1  2.6 +4.4 3.9 –1.0 11.1 +5.5  +6.9
Finland 10.7  +3.1  7.3 +3.2 6.0 –0.7 24.0 +5.6  +2.2
Belgium 10.4  +5.1  7.1 +2.4 5.6 –0.7 23.1 +6.8 +1.5
Hungary
b 10.4  +6.7  5.5 +1.0 4.5 –0.7 20.4 +7.0  +2.7
Czech Rep.  8.5  +5.6  6.7 +2.4 3.8 –0.7 19.0 +7.3  +6.8
Ireland 4.7  +6.4  5.9 +2.6 4.1 –1.0 14.7 +8.0  +6.0
Spain 8.6  +7.1  6.6 +2.4 3.7 –0.6 18.9 +8.9  +2.9
Portugal
b 11.1  +9.7  6.7 +0.5 -0.4 –0.4 17.4 +9.8  +6.3
a) Initial level: 2000. 
b) Expenditure on long-term care not included in the projections. 
c) Reduction in annual primary deficit ratios required to meet the government’s intertemporal budget 
constraint in spite of the projected impact of ageing on age-related public expenditure (‘T-3’ variant of the 
‘sustainability gap’ as defined in Economic Policy Committee, 2003) 
Sources:  for EU-25 countries: European Commission and Economic Policy Committee (2006) and Euro-
pean Commission (2006); for the US and Japan: OECD (2001, ch. 4) and Hauner et al. (2007). 
 
Table 2 also shows that expected increases in expenditure on health and long-term care 
are now often larger than those projected for public pension schemes. Furthermore, 
these increases can even be bigger than is explained by purely demographic trends (cf. 
Table 1). The reason is that the projections related to actual policies also include an im-
pact of technical progress on health costs that is independent of demographic change,   18
but has consistently been observed in many countries in the past.
5 It is impossible to 
predict whether these cost increases will continue if health systems and public finances 
are more and more under demographic pressure, or whether medical progress might 
change its direction in the future. There are thus substantial uncertainties concerning the 
future evolution of public health expenditure. It is worth noting, however, that long-
term projections for health expenditure typically assume the cost-side effects of medical 
progress to become much weaker than they have been so far, so that they involve a sub-
stantial upward risk (see, e.g., Breyer and Ulrich 2000; Werding, 2007). 
 
In any case, cost containment in the health-care sector is a major issue that remains to 
be addressed in many countries. The same applies to long-term care, where current lev-
els of expenditure are smaller, while relative increases related to ageing are much more 
pronounced than in other areas. Thus far, no country has started to really deal with these 
problems. At least, certainly no country has found a key to avoiding continuous cost 
surprises without reducing the availability and/or the quality of services. Ideally, dealing 
with the prospects of increasing health costs could mean three things, alternatively or in 
combination. One could make attempts to reduce any inefficiencies involved in current 
systems of delivery and financing. One could try to push medical progress in a new, 
cost-saving direction. Or one must think about ways of paying for costly, high-quality 
medical services and of making them available for as many people as possible – in spite 
of the financial pressures through ageing. Partial pre-funding may thus also become an 
issue in health care and long-term care, as it already is in old-age provision. The dis-
tributive side of such reforms is probably even more delicate than it is with respect to 
pensions. Given this complication as well as the diversity of current national arrange-
ments, there is apparently no one-size-fits-all solution which the countries affected most 
severely could simply borrow from each other. 
 
 
IV.3 Outlook: Re-organising the System of Intergenerational Transactions 
 
Basically, all the options for reform we have discussed here thus far are suitable, more 
or less, to mitigate the adverse consequences of ageing for the welfare state. In most 
countries, it is too late to avert ageing altogether as measures to increase mortality are 
ruled out as acceptable policy instruments. Higher immigration can slow down ageing 
processes, and it is most likely favourable for the welfare state in countries where age-
                                            
5   Otherwise, the projections are based on the assumption that age-specific morbidity decreases as life 
expectancy goes up (as in Table 1) and that there will be no special increase in costs near death 
through new forms of multi-morbidity, etc. (see Zweifel et al., 2004).   19
ing is most severe (Werding and Munz, 2005). However, the numbers of immigrants to 
the developed world are immensely high that would be needed, with a very particular 
timing and geographical distribution, to keep current demographic dependency ratios 
constant over time. Increasing fertility rates, especially in countries where they have 
become extremely low, may also sound promising as a direct approach to slowing down 
ageing. But by the inertia of demographic processes, a higher number of children born 
today has an impact on the old-age dependency ratio only after 15 years, on the sys-
tems’ dependency ratios of public pension schemes only after 20 years, and both types 
of effects become considerable only after 30 years or more. Still, fertility is particular in 
that it may be a determinant of demographic ageing which is affected by activities of the 
welfare state in a way that ought to be corrected, both for reasons of efficiency and for 
reasons of equity. We will therefore discuss this point and its potential policy implica-
tions as an outlook that concludes our previous considerations. 
 
Public pay-as-you-go schemes covering expenditure with a strong age-related profile – 
most notably pensions, but also health costs or education – are interventions in private 
systems of intergenerational transactions. They interfere with market-based arrange-
ments based on savings, loans and insurance no less than with traditional arrangements 
mainly based on transactions within the family. In fact, public pay-as-you-go schemes 
providing for the old are mimicking the logic of these intra-family arrangements, allow-
ing to insure against unfortunate outcomes of investment in education (see Meier and 
Wrede, 2010); yet, they do so in an imperfect way (Cigno, 1993). At the same time, 
they are actually funded, viz. by the human capital embodied in those who are expected 
to pay for future benefits. Therefore, the trouble with pay-as-you-go pension schemes as 
they are conventionally designed is that, for the individuals covered, they do not provide 
any incentives to invest in the human capital of the next generation of tax payers. Bene-
fit entitlements are essentially assessed based on the amounts of financial contributions 
made, or the number of years for which this has been done. Raising children and invest-
ing in their education may therefore reduce one’s own benefit entitlements, while it 
gives rise to a potentially huge fiscal externality in favour of other beneficiaries or tax 
payers of these systems. 
 
It is true that this fiscal externality may become smaller through tax-financed public 
expenditure on education, child benefits, health care for children, etc. Some countries 
have even introduced child-related components of pension benefit entitlements – most 
notably, France (in 1974), Germany (in 1986), or Sweden (in 1998) – which are mainly 
meant to compensate for reductions in regular, earnings-related benefit entitlements 
associated with child-care activities (for descriptions and an in-depth analysis of the   20
effects of these rules, see Cigno and Werding, 2007, ch. 4). However, in countries with 
generous, unfunded systems of old-age support and health insurance the total effect of 
all these measures still falls short by a substantial margin of the value of children as a 
funding source of public pensions, health care for the elderly, etc. (Werding, 2010). 
 
Assuming that one of the reasons why people have children is an ‘investment motive’ 
related to old-age provision, economic theory clearly predicts a negative impact of this 
fiscal (net) externality on fertility (see, e.g., Cigno 1993).
6 It appears that this effect of 
the introduction and expansion of unfunded public pensions is also empirically relevant 
(Cigno and Rosati, 1996; Ehrlich and Zhong, 1998; Ehrlich and Kim 2007), even 
though it certainly does not explain the entire decline in fertility rates observed in most 
developed countries. In any case, this line of reasoning leads to an efficiency case for 
reconsidering the way in which the welfare state currently intervenes in the field of int-
ergenerational transactions. A parallel line of reasoning is about equity, both in an inter-
generational and an intragenerational dimension. In conventional pay-as-you-go pension 
schemes, all contributors have to pay for members of the old generation who are cur-
rently drawing benefits. To make provisions for their own future benefit entitlements, 
they would also have to invest in children and in their future earnings capacity. How-
ever, this requirement is not reflected in the conventional design of pay-as-you-go pen-
sions. Basically, generations with smaller average numbers of children have reduced 
this kind of investment. Scaling back their average benefit entitlements, e.g. by switch-
ing from DB to NDC schemes or by extending their active period of life, could therefore 
be considered appropriate (while applying equity norms to an intergenerational context 
is conceptually difficult). But as some people still have two or more children, while oth-
ers have just one child or none, the former effectively providing for the pensions of the 
latter, equity considerations suggest to go even further in the revision of current sys-
tems. 
 
A natural approach to reducing the fiscal externality of children together with the redis-
tribution involved is to adapt the traditional design of unfunded pension schemes. In 
order to address the problem at its roots, this could be done by differentiating individual 
benefit entitlements by the number of children, respectively by the contributions of their 
children to the pension scheme (Sinn, 2004; Cigno and Werding, 2007, chs. 7 and 8; 
Meier and Wrede, 2010). When a (higher) fraction of unfunded pension entitlements 
                                            
6   An alternative interpretation of the type of institutional failure that is relevant here is provided by Sinn 
(2004): taking unfunded public pensions to be an insurance against being childless, covering this risk 
through fully-fledged benefit entitlements in old age for all members creates unfavourable incentives 
for moral-hazard behaviour.   21
becomes child-related, while average pension benefits have to be reduced for demo-
graphic reasons, this may have two types of behavioural consequences which are fa-
vourable with respect to the consequences of ageing for the welfare state. First, it may 
imply that higher complementary savings which are needed to deal with the ageing 
problem effectively concentrate among those with few or no children. On average, these 
people should have more resources available for doing so. Second, it may contribute to 
a recovery of current low fertility rates, rendering the welfare state more sustainable in 
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